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In this article we advance the conjecture that conscious 
awareness is equivalent to data compression. Algorithmic 
information theory supports the assertion that all forms of 
understanding are contingent on compression (Chaitin, 2007). 
Here, we argue that the experience people refer to as 
consciousness is the particular form of understanding that the 
brain provides. We therefore propose that the degree of 
consciousness of a system can be measured in terms of the 
amount of data compression it carries out.  
Keywords: Information theory, data compression, 
Solomonoff induction, phenomenal experience, Turing test.  
Introduction 
According to Einstein, the most incomprehensible thing 
about the world is that it is comprehensible. But what does it 
mean to comprehend? A common feature of understanding 
in both science and mathematics is that it involves the 
reduction of a set of observations or truths to a more basic 
set of assumptions. Indeed, Chaitin (2007) has proposed that 
all forms of understanding can be viewed as instances of 
data compression. Have a look at the sequence below and 
see if you can ‘understand’ it: 
 
4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 20, 24... 
 
What is involved in understanding this sequence? 
Intuitively, one searches for a pattern that links all of the 
numbers together. If the numbers were randomly selected, 
then, more than likely, no pattern could be identified. In this 
case the sequence could not be described any more 
concisely: it would be incompressible. However, the above 
sequence seems amenable to compression. For example, one 
can posit the following hypothesis: “start at 4 and keep 
adding 2, except if the digits of the previous number sum to 
2, 5 or 8, in which case add 4”. These instructions provide a 
complete description of the sequence. However, because the 
description seems somewhat unwieldy, it is not particularly 
convincing. A more concise description is possible: “go 
through all odd prime numbers and add 1”. Because this 
hypothesis is more concise, it intuitively reflects a deeper 
understanding of the sequence. 
Scientific understanding is furthered by exposing greater 
levels of redundancy in observational data. The goal of the 
scientist is to craft a model which can describe a dataset in 
more concise terms. These models are called theories. The 
more compression a theory achieves, the greater its value. 
For example, Kepler’s heliocentric model of the heavens is 
considered superior to Ptolemy’s geocentric model, because 
it manages to describe astronomical observations in terms of 
three simple mathematical laws rather than a convoluted set 
of epicycles. 
The idea that compression underpins scientific endeavor 
is not new. Occam’s razor is a fundamental scientific 
principle which is attributed to the 14th century English 
friar, William of Ockham. The principle states that the 
explanation of any phenomenon should make as few 
assumptions as possible, eliminating those that make no 
difference to the observable predictions: “entities should not 
be multiplied unnecessarily”. This law of parsimony implies 
that if you have two competing theories which both describe 
a phenomenon, the simpler (i.e. more compressed) 
explanation is better.  
Algorithmic Information Theory 
As homo sapien sapiens (Latin for knowing man), the urge 
to understand is a defining characteristic of our species. But 
why is it that we should devote so much energy to 
understanding the world around us? In order to answer this 
question we must turn to algorithmic information theory. 
Algorithmic information theory is a field which brings 
together mathematics, logic and computer science. The 
foundations of this field were laid by Chaitin, Solomonoff 
and Kolmogorov in the 1960s (see Li & Vitányi, 1997). 
According to Chaitin, it is “the result of putting Shannon’s 
information theory and Turing’s computability theory into a 
cocktail shaker and shaking vigorously”. The basic idea is 
that the complexity of an object can be represented by the 
size of the smallest program for computing it. This new way 
of thinking about information was first proposed by 
Solomonoff (1964) and subsequently independently 
identified by Kolmogorov and Chaitin.  
Algorithmic theory provides a clear answer as to why 
organisms should seek to compress observational data. 
Specifically, Solomonoff’s (1964) theory of inductive 
inference reveals that compression is a necessary component 
of prediction. The theory provides a universal measure of 
the probability of an object by taking into account all of the 
ways in which it might have been produced. This universal a 
priori probability can then be incorporated into Bayes’ rule 
for inductive inference in order to make optimal predictions 
based on a set of prior observations. 
Solomonoff’s theory of inductive inference reveals that 
the more a set of observations can be compressed, the more 
accurately subsequent events can be predicted. Consider 
again the sequence 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 20, 24... The long-
winded description predicts that the next number in the 
sequence will be 26, while the more succinct description 
predicts that 30 will follow. According to Solomonoff’s 
theory, the latter must be the better prediction, because it 
involves a fewer number of assumptions: the shorter the 
length of the description, the more likely it is to be correct.  
Algorithmic information theory reveals that compression 
is the only systematic means for generating predictions 
based on prior observations. All successful predictive 
systems, including animals and humans, are approximations 
of algorithmic induction. All useful contributions to human 
knowledge work by coaxing people into modifying their 
inductive strategies in such a way that they better 
approximate algorithmic induction. 
In order to thrive in an uncertain environment, 
organisms must be able to anticipate future events; the more 
efficiently they can compress their experiences, the more 
accurate these predictions will be. Consequently, organisms 
have evolved brains which are prodigious compressors of 
information: compressing sensory information provides 
them with an ‘understanding’ of their environment (see 
Chater & Vitányi, 2002; Schmidhuber, 2006; Wolff, 1993). 
Tononi (2008) has proposed that the feeling of being 
conscious must be linked in some way to the integration of 
information which occurs in the brain. In the following 
sections we specify precisely the relationship between 
information processing and subjective awareness: 
specifically, we argue that the experience people describe as 
consciousness is equivalent to the compression that the 
brain carries out. Henceforth, this idea is referred to as the 
‘compression conjecture’. It should be noted that the 
conjecture does not merely suppose an association between 
consciousness and compression; rather it asserts that no 
meaningful distinction can be drawn between the two 
concepts.  
Consciousness 
From an evolutionary perspective, the sole purpose of the 
brain is to produce behavior that optimizes the reproductive 
success of an organism and its genetic material. Features of 
the brain which are not linked to optimizing behavior should 
therefore not have been rigorously preserved by evolution. 
Why then should brains go to the trouble of producing 
consciousness?  
Algorithmic information theory tells us that the key to 
enhancing prediction (and hence reproductive success) is to 
optimize data compression. If the principal evolutionary 
pressure determining the structure of the brain has been its 
capacity to compress data, and if brains are the only system 
we know of that support consciousness, then this suggests a 
rigorous link between consciousness and compression. 
Systems that are good at compressing data seem to produce 
consciousness. But why should this be the case? 
The Brain as a Compressor 
In order to answer this question, we must consider the 
nature of the compression that the brain carries out. In other 
words, what type of understanding does the brain provide? 
The success of an organism is dependent on cooperation 
between all of its constituent components. In order to 
achieve the goal of reproduction, it must exhibit coordinated 
behavior. For example, it does not make sense for an 
organism’s legs to maintain independent agenda. Because 
the interests of both legs are intimately bound, it is more 
productive for them to cooperate with each other in 
achieving a single set of objectives (e.g. putting one foot 
forward while the other stays on the ground). Accordingly, 
the brain sources sensory information from all over the body 
and compresses it in parallel, thereby optimizing predictive 
accuracy for the organism as a whole. Tactile information 
from every limb is compressed in parallel with visual 
information from the eyes and audio information from the 
ears, giving rise to a form of understanding that is 
centralized and representative of the organism’s experiences 
as a singular unit. The resulting decisions of the organism 
also appear centralized: to the external observer it seems as 
if the organism’s body is being ‘controlled’ by a single 
entity with a singular set of objectives. 
Not only does the success of an organism depend on 
cooperation between its constituent components, it also 
depends on cooperation between its past and future states. 
Snapshots of an organism’s behavior taken at different 
points in time again reveal evidence of a singular set of 
objectives. For example, if you know you will be hungry in 
several hours time, you might pack a lunchbox in your bag. 
In this case, you are cooperating with your future self. From 
an evolutionary perspective, organisms cooperate with their 
future selves because reproduction is a challenging task 
which requires coordinated behavior manifested over an 
extended period of time. As a result, the brain goes to the 
effort of distilling memories which are maintained with the 
expectation that they will facilitate data compression at a 
future point.   
The utility of memory can again be explained in terms of 
enhancing algorithmic induction. Memory allows us to 
make greater sense of the world by enhancing our ability to 
carry out compression. Incoming sensory data are 
compressed in parallel with stored historical data, allowing 
redundancy to be identified more efficiently and, 
consequently, enhancing predictive accuracy. Thus, the 
form of understanding that the brain produces unites not 
only distributed sensory organs but also past and current 
states of an organism. The compression conjecture proposes 
that the experience of this unitary form of understanding is 
what we mean when we use the term ‘consciousness’. 
 
Self-Awareness 
Intuitively, the above account does not seem fully 
satisfactory. For example, one might conceive of an 
artificial compressor which compresses large amounts of 
current and historical data in parallel, though without 
experiencing the same form of awareness that we humans 
are familiar with. Indeed, the compression carried out by the 
brain has one additional ingredient which sets it apart from 
simpler compression systems: it compresses its observations 
of its own behavior. The capacity for a system to model its 
own actions necessarily involves the identification of itself 
as an entity separate to its surroundings. As a result, self-
compression entails self-awareness. 
The human brain is a self-representational structure 
which seeks to understand its own behavior. For example, 
people model their own selves in order to more accurately 
predict how they are going to feel and react in different 
situations. They build up internal models about who they 
think they are and use these models to inform their 
decisions. In addition, the human brain compresses the 
observed behavior of other organisms. When we watch 
other individuals, we realize that there is a great deal of 
redundancy in their activity: rather than simply cataloguing 
and memorizing every action they perform, we can instead 
posit the more succinct hypothesis of a concise ‘self’ which 
motivates these actions. By representing this self we can 
then make accurate predictions as to how the people around 
us will behave. The idea that the actions of an organism are 
controlled by a singular self is merely a theoretical model 
which eliminates redundancy in the observed behavior of 
that organism. People apply this same process to 
themselves: what you consider to be the essence of you is 
simply a model which compresses your observations of your 
own past behavior. 
Phenomenality 
A significant obstacle to providing a fully satisfactory 
theory of consciousness lies in explaining the phenomenon 
of subjective experience: why is it that we experience qualia 
which seem to elude scientific description? According to the 
consciousness conjecture, the ‘flavor’ of a quale can be 
linked to the particular form of compression that the brain 
carries out in response to a stimulus. 
If an organism perceives a stimulus, yet can discern no 
pattern in the sensory data, then that stimulus will appear 
completely random and meaningless to the organism: the 
stimulus will not be experienced at all. On the other hand, if 
some redundancy can be identified, then the stimulus can be 
‘understood’ (i.e. experienced) by relating it to previously 
gathered sensory information. For example, when people 
look at an apple, they perceive a round shape by identifying 
redundancy between the appearance of the apple and 
previously encountered round objects; they perceive a green 
color by identifying redundancy between the appearance of 
the apple and previously encountered green objects. When 
we ‘see’ an apple we are not just processing an 
instantaneous visual stimulus but, rather, compressing a set 
of data which has been gathered over a wide cross section of 
space and time. The structure of the brain allows a sensory 
stimulus to be translated into the subjective experience of 
understanding through the process of compression. 
In sum, people don’t passively observe the world around 
them; they gaze through the lens of understanding provided 
by their brains. When people talk about their subjective 
experience they are referring to the particular form of 
compression that their brain provides. The reason that these 
qualitative descriptions differ from objective scientific 
descriptions is because the subjective experience of a 
stimulus is dependent on how it is processed. The particular 
‘flavors’ of qualia that we humans are familiar with are 
artifacts of our cognition, which are determined by the 
patterns our brains have evolved to detect and encode. 
Describing Qualia  
Intuitively, qualia appear to resist objective description. 
However, this intuition must be flawed, for if qualia could 
not be recorded in some informational form in the brain then 
we would not be able to remember them. In this case, all 
current subjective experiences would seem random and 
meaningless because there would be no previous subjective 
experiences with which to reconcile them. 
According to the compression conjecture, which 
supposes that subjective experience and data compression 
are equivalent, it should be possible to provide a full 
description of a quale by detailing the compression that a 
system achieves in response to a stimulus. Thus, for 
example, the experience of red could be captured by 
describing the changing structure of the brain in response to 
the sight of a red object. This experience could then be 
comprehensively represented in terms of bits of bytes and 
could feasibly be contained in a book. Yet, intuitively, a 
book containing symbols could never capture the experience 
of the color red in the same way that we feel it; leafing 
through the pages of the book would not give rise to the 
subjective feeling of red. How can this apparent incongruity 
be rationalized? 
The compression conjecture indicates that even if a book 
does carry a complete description of a subjective 
experience, merely reading the book is not sufficient for 
reproducing that experience. To appreciate it, the reader 
must be capable of compressing the data in the same manner 
in which it was originally compressed. For example, rather 
than simply leafing apathetically through pages of symbols, 
the reader must be capable of identifying the underlying 
patterns which link those symbols together. If a system is 
incapable of compressing the data, then it cannot 
‘understand’ the experience which is contained within. 
Experience is dependent on the system which is doing the 
experiencing, as opposed to being intrinsic to a stimulus. 
Because reading a description of compression will not 
necessarily cause the same compression to occur in your 
own brain, reading about the experience of red will not 
make you experience red.  
The Hard Problem 
Initially, it might not be clear that the above satisfactorily 
addresses the hard problem of consciousness, which 
Chalmers (1995) identifies as the question of why 
consciousness feels like anything at all. In order to tackle 
this question, let us consider the case of an assembly of 
coordinated neurons (or, indeed, logic gates) called Amy. If 
we observe Amy’s behavior over time, we will notice 
considerable redundancy in her actions. We can compress 
Amy’s behavior through the succinct hypothesis of a core 
centralized self which is motivating her actions and which 
feels experiences. But this is just an abstract hypothesis 
based on a dataset: why should the formation of a 
hypothesis result in experience? The answer to this question 
lies in the realization that the hypothesis of Amy’s 
subjective experience is a hypothesis which Amy herself 
holds, an understanding which is manifested through the 
compression she carries out. Understanding the hypothesis 
that one is feeling something and the actual experience of 
feeling are the same thing. Amy’s feeling therefore exists 
relative to the assumption of her own existence, an 
assumption which the system itself is capable of making. 
Conscious Systems 
Algorithmic information theory makes clear predictions 
regarding what systems are conscious: objects which carry 
out compression are conscious, all other objects are not. Let 
us consider a chair. Intuitively, we would not expect a chair 
to be conscious. Can this intuition be justified by the 
compression conjecture? 
Chairs do not carry out compression. They do not source 
sensory information from multiple locations and process it 
in parallel. They do not store memories to enhance future 
compression. And they do not develop a theory of self by 
compressing their own actions. Therefore they are not 
conscious. 
Imagine holding a flame to the leg of a chair. The flame 
leaves a black mark, therefore the chair has certainly been 
affected by the flame. But intuitively, it does not seem 
reasonable to claim that the chair has experienced the flame. 
This difference between effect and experience is directly 
related to compression: specifically, the chair fails to 
experience the flame because the information it provides is 
not compressed in any way. If a chair’s leg is burned it has 
no effect on any of the other legs. No information is 
communicated, and consequently there is no inter-leg data 
compression to bind the experiences of the chair together. 
Furthermore, the chair stores no memory (other than a black 
mark). The burning event has no effect on how subsequent 
events are processed, meaning that the experiences of the 
chair are not bound together across time. Finally, because 
the chair does not compress its own response to the flame, it 
has no awareness of any subjective experience. 
In contrast, if a flame is held to the leg of a human, it has 
an immediate effect on how information from all other parts 
of the body is processed. The brain also stores a memory of 
being burned, thus altering the individual’s future behavior 
in a manner which reflects the interests of the system as a 
whole. People ‘feel’ the effect of being burned because the 
compression carried out by their brain reflects an 
understanding of what it feels like to be burned. In contrast, 
no matter how many times you burn a chair, it will never 
react any differently. 
Artificial Consciousness 
The consciousness conjecture suggests that any system that 
carries out compression can be considered conscious to 
some extent. However, it should be noted that no known 
system is capable of matching or even approaching the 
depth of compression carried out by the organic brain.  
Although computer algorithms such as Lempel-Ziv and 
BZip2 are used to compress files and text, these programs 
simply skim through data looking for trivial redundancy. 
Such compressors cannot realistically be described as 
‘understanding’ text because the only patterns they can 
identify are based on simple statistical repetitions of 
symbols. In contrast, when people read a book they can 
‘explain’ the text in terms of an underlying narrative derived 
from their own experiences of the world, a feat which 
involves a much deeper level of compression.  
Nevertheless, there is no theoretical obstacle that would 
prevent consciousness from being implemented in an 
artificial medium. Any system that is arranged and updated 
in a way which allows for the compression of information 
will support consciousness, be it implemented in windmills, 
beer cans or toilet rolls. Although toilet rolls take up a lot 
more space and interact a lot more slowly, they can be 
arranged in such a manner so as to perfectly replicate the 
compression carried out by neurons in the brain.  
Of course, the idea that a conscious being could be 
implemented in toilet rolls is very unsatisfactory. Such an 
implementation exacerbates the hard problem of reconciling 
a clearly reducible system with the feeling of intuitively 
irreducible experiences. One might ask: where does the 
consciousness reside? In this case the consciousness is not a 
property of any particular toilet roll. Rather, it is a property 
of the toilet roll system as a whole. Just like the behavior of 
a human, the output of the toilet roll system exhibits deep 
redundancy which can be effectively compressed through 
the hypothesis of a single centralized ‘self’. In particular, the 
toilet roll system is itself aware of this hypothesis, and uses 
the theory of selfhood to guide its processing. The 
consciousness of the system therefore resides in its capacity 
to understand (i.e. compress) what it senses, thereby 
identifying itself as an entity separate to its environment.  
The Location of Consciousness 
Thus far, we have used the term ‘compression’ without 
describing precisely how compression can be identified in 
the brain. Where is it to be found? Intuitively, people 
assume that conscious experience must be drawn together at 
a single point, an idea which Dennett (1991) derisively 
refers to as the ‘Cartesian theatre’. However, brain imaging 
studies indicate that cognitive processing is widely 
distributed and does not appear to be bound at any particular 
point in space or time (Zeki, 2003).  
Although intuition might suggest the need for a 
Cartesian theatre, it is important to note that the 
evolutionary demands which have shaped the brain’s 
structure have not required information processing to be 
integrated in this way. The only moment that the brain is 
required to bring information together is when some action 
must be elicited; furthermore, only data relevant to that 
action needs to be integrated. Outside of this constraint, 
processing can remain distributed in space and time, with no 
impact on the success of the organism.  
Accordingly, external time and ‘conscious time’ need 
not be synchronized to any greater extent other than to 
facilitate the undertaking of action when required. However, 
conscious observers have no possible means for observing 
any distribution in their consciousness relative to the 
environment: whenever they act on their surroundings the 
appropriate information processing is pulled together ‘just in 
time’. Since it always appears to the observer as if they are 
embodied at a particular point in space and time, this leads 
them to mistakenly assume that their consciousness must be 
brought together at a single point in the brain, giving rise to 
the Cartesian theatre fallacy.  
How Does the Brain Create Consciousness? 
One of the goals of consciousness research is to identify 
how it is created in the brain: which neural structures 
support consciousness and which are merely superfluous 
biological apparatus? Using elementary computability 
theory we will prove that, if the compression conjecture 
holds, then the goal of identifying a complete theory of 
consciousness is unattainable. 
Let us imagine that somebody someday submits a theory 
which offers a full description of how the brain produces 
consciousness. The theory is complete, meaning that it is 
capable of identifying precisely which structures in the brain 
give rise to consciousness, separating the conscious part 
from the non-conscious meat. Now, of course, the reviewers 
wish to check that the theory is correct. Accordingly, they 
apply the theory to their own brain activity to see whether 
the predictions match their experience. However, this raises 
the question: are the reviewers able to define their own 
consciousness, as required to validate the theory? Is it 
possible for a system to define its own self? In fact, 
computability theory rules this out, meaning that a complete 
theory of consciousness is not possible. 
According to the compression conjecture, the 
recognition of one’s own consciousness involves the 
identification of a structure which carries out the same form 
of compression. We can therefore present the problem 
formally in terms of a Turing machine which is capable of 
recognizing a program with the same input-output 
relationship. Consider a Turing machine T which takes input 
x and outputs 1 if L(T) = L(x) (i.e. the languages recognized 
by T and x) and 0 if L(T) ≠ L(x). Is such a machine possible? 
The machine T is not consistent. We can imagine 
another machine A which takes input x. The machine A first 
computes T(A). If T(A) = 1 it then outputs 1 – T(x), which is 
the opposite of T, while if T(A) = 0 it then outputs T(x), 
which is the same as T. In other words, the machine A 
checks to see whether T recognizes it as being equivalent or 
not. If T recognizes A as being equivalent then A proceeds to 
do the exact opposite, making it not equivalent to T. 
However, if T does not recognize A as being equivalent then 
A produces the same output at T, making it equivalent to T. 
There is no way around this obstacle (see Rice’s theorem; 
Rice, 1953). Since no system can recognize an equivalent 
system from within itself, developing a complete theory of 
consciousness is not possible: the more precisely a theory 
attempts to define the conscious structure of the brain, the 
less feasible it will be to validate it. 
The unrecognizability of the self has important 
implications for how we think about ourselves. For instance, 
we can never know who we really are; we can never fully 
explain our actions; we can never be certain as to what we 
are going to do next. In effect, the self is a helpless observer 
carried along by the compression going on in the brain. Of 
course, one feels like one is directing one’s own actions 
because, as far as one is aware, one is. According to the 
compression conjecture, the model of the self is simply an 
explanatory mechanism that the brain uses to explain and 
predict its own behavior. As a result, the actions of the brain 
cannot help but be consistent with those of the self (see 
Gazzaniga, 1992). However, it is the activity of the brain 
which defines the nature of the self, rather than the other 
way around. Are you controlling your own actions? 
Certainly, but at the same time you can never know who you 
is. 
Measuring Consciousness 
If, as the compression conjecture supposes, consciousness is 
equivalent to data compression, then it should be possible to 
measure consciousness by quantifying the amount of 
compression that a system is capable of. The formal 
measure of compression is logical depth (see Bennett, 
1988). Bennett's idea is that objects can be trivial, random or 
deep. Trivial objects, being completely predictable, contain 
no useful information; random ones, being completely 
unpredictable, do not contain any useful information either. 
In contrast, objects that are neither random nor trivial are 
called deep objects, because they support deep compression. 
Deep objects are useful because they provide a store of 
mathematical work, allowing associated data to be 
compressed far more efficiently than can be achieved using 
shallower tools. Indeed, Bennett’s (1988) theory implies that 
the concepts of ‘depth’ and ‘intelligence’ are equivalent, 
since the facilitation of compression that depth provides 
cannot be replicated by alternative means. Of all known 
objects, the human brain is the deepest, representing the 
stored mathematical work of decades of active cognitive 
processing on top of billions of years of evolution. The brain 
relies on its depth to mitigate the physical limitations on 
information processing imposed by its biological structure, 
such as limited storage capacity, processing speed and 
susceptibility to degradation. The complexity of its structure 
allows people to effortlessly identify patterns which 
continue to elude the most advanced artificial intelligence 
programs. 
The Turing Test 
Turing (1950) suggested that if a computer, through a 
textual interface, can successfully convince a human judge 
that it is human, then it should be considered equal in 
intelligence to a human. However, the Turing test is not a 
reliable indicator of depth. Fooling a human judge is 
unlikely to require a deep program: a far simpler solution is 
to exploit the weaknesses of human psychology.  
We propose an alternative test, involving compression, 
on which it is not possible to cheat. Because of its 
complexity, natural language provides the ideal medium for 
testing compressor depth. People use complex linguistic 
patterns to communicate with each other and assume that 
other speakers are capable of compressing the words they 
produce. If a computer system is as intelligent as a human, 
then it should be capable of compressing language to the 
same extent as a human. 
According to algorithmic information theory, 
compression can be quantified in terms of predictive 
accuracy. For example, Shannon (1951) examined the 
human-perceived entropy of English by asking people to 
predict each letter in a document, one by one. The entropy 
rate turned out to be less than 1 bit per letter. People are able 
to predict language because of the fact that they 
‘understand’ the text. In contrast, artificial compressors like 
BZip2 and Lempel-Ziv achieve much poorer levels of 
compression because they rely on predictable sequences of 
characters, without any regard for the deeper connections 
between words, sentences and narrative. If a computer was 
genuinely as intelligent as a human, it would be capable of 
matching the entropy rate of 1 bit per letter that Shannon 
observed. 
We propose that the compression test is far more reliable 
and practical than the Turing test. For a start, there is no 
way to cheat: by definition, deep processing cannot be 
reproduced by any means other than underlying depth (the 
Slow Growth Law; see Bennett, 1988). It is also extremely 
quick and reliable: the probability of guessing the correct 
symbols decreases exponentially with the length of the test. 
While the Turing test is ambiguous and is affected by the 
gullibility of the tester, the compression test is simple, 
rigorous, reproducible and provides an exact measure of 
intelligence by means of the relative entropy score.  
Conclusion 
Intuitions regarding consciousness seem to create many 
problems which have not been satisfactorily resolved (see 
Dennett, 1991). In contrast, the framework we have 
described here can explain many of the questions regarding 
consciousness in an unambiguous and consistent manner. 
The compression conjecture explains why a brain that 
evolved to optimize an organism’s behavior should be 
associated with consciousness. It explains why 
consciousness is not amenable to scientific description. It 
explains what we mean by ‘the self’ and why brains provide 
self-awareness. It explains the apparent paradox of 
experiencing a singular perspective in a brain which carries 
out distributed processing. It predicts what systems are 
conscious and what systems are not; it reveals that a 
complete theory of consciousness is not possible. It tells us 
how to identify consciousness and it even provides a 
standard by which to measure consciousness.  
The compression conjecture does not require special 
neuro-biological causal properties. It does not require 
mysterious quantum fluctuations in micro-tubules. It does 
not require an additional imperceptible dimension to the 
universe. It does not require the actions of a divine being. In 
fact, it requires nothing except data compression. 
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